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performance data provides useful information to principals in constructing employee evaluations and
using these evaluations to improve productivity.
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 Economists interested in educational production have increasingly focused on issues 
surrounding teachers.  There is considerable evidence that productivity varies greatly across 
teachers (Rockoff (2004), Rivkin et al. (2005), Aaronson et al. (2007)), and two recent papers 
(Gordon et al. (2006), Kane and Staiger (2008)) argue in favor of using estimates of a teacher’s 
“value-added”—the teacher’s contribution to changes in student achievement, as measured by 
standardized tests—to evaluate teachers.1  Motivated in part by this research, the federal 
government is encouraging states and school districts to use student achievement growth in 
measures of teacher effectiveness and to implement policies to “recruit, develop, reward, and 
retain effective teachers” as part of the incentives built into its $4.3 billion Race to the Top Fund. 
 How should estimates of teacher performance based on student outcomes be used to 
evaluate teachers?  Some important insights are provided by the vast body of research in 
economics on performance evaluation, incentives in employment contracts, and personnel 
decisions (see reviews by Prendergast (1999), Gibbons (1998, 2005)).  First, teachers are likely 
to be “motivated agents” who work for “idealistic reasons or because they enjoy working with 
children” (Dixit (2002)) and may not require high-powered incentives (see also Besley and 
Ghatak (2005)).  Thus, it is reasonable to believe that disparities in teacher effectiveness may 
have more to do with persistent variation in skills than exertion of effort.2   
 Second, teaching is a multi-dimensional task with multiple goals.  In this setting, basing 
employee evaluations on simple objective performance measures may lead to dysfunctional 
behaviors (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)), like cheating on standardized tests (Jacob and 
                                                 
1 There is still considerable discussion surrounding the validity of the assumptions underlying value-added estimates 
(Todd and Wolpin (2003), Rothstein (2009)).  While our paper does not focus on these concerns, we refer the reader 
to the analyses and discussions in Harris and Sass (2006), Goldhaber and Hansen (2009), Koedel and Betts (2009), 
and Staiger and Rockoff (2010). 
2 This view may not be entirely appropriate in describing public schools in developing countries, where teachers 
often do not show up to work or are found not to be teaching when independently observed (Chaudhury et al. 2006). 
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Levitt (2003)).3  In order to avoid this problem, principals can link personnel decisions to 
holistic, subjective evaluations that capture a teacher’s overall contribution to the school.   
 Third, even when outcomes for the employee are determined by holistic evaluations, the 
presence of an objective measure of performance that is verifiable to a third party can be useful 
(Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)).  Such a measure may be valuable to principals who 
possess imperfect information on employee performance.  Moreover, even if principals can 
easily observe performance, objective measures allow them to dismiss unproductive workers 
without gaining bad reputations and assure workers they will be rewarded if they perform well. 
 There is relatively little empirical work by economists on subjective employee 
evaluation, and much of it is descriptive.  For example, studies have documented the prevalence 
(or lack thereof) of subjective and objective performance evaluation across occupations (e.g., 
Baker et al. (1988), Murphy and Oyer (2001)), managers’ reluctance to differentiate among 
employees (e.g., Medoff and Abraham (1980), Murphy (1992)), and managerial bias in the 
evaluation process (see Prendergast and Topel (1993)).  In the context of public schools, there is 
some work showing that school principals’ opinions of teacher effectiveness are correlated with 
estimates based on student test scores (Murnane (1975), Jacob and Lefgren (2008), Harris and 
Sass (2008)), but principals, like private sector managers, are reluctant to give teachers poor 
evaluations (Weisberg et al. (2009)) or officially dismiss them (Jacob (2007, 2010)). 
 In this paper, we examine how managers develop and use subjective evaluations, and 
how these processes are affected by the presence of objective performance data.  We do so in the 
context of a pilot program conducted by the New York City Department of Education (hereafter 
                                                 
3 Teachers are also highly unionized in the U.S. and oppose linking pay directly to objective performance measures, 
providing few examples of how such contracts work in practice (see Ballou (2001), Turner and Goodman (2009)).  
For research on teacher pay-for-performance contracts outside of the U.S., see Lavy (2002, 2009), Muralidharan and 
Sundaraman (2008). 
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the DOE) during the school year 2007-2008.  School principals were randomly selected from a 
group of volunteers to receive performance measures (i.e., estimates of “value-added”) for 
teachers at their schools, as well as training on the methodology used to construct the estimates.  
The remaining volunteer principals serve as a control group, allowing us to draw causal 
inferences regarding the impact of distributing the objective performance data. 
 We begin by laying out a basic model of employee evaluation in which principals use 
imperfect information to learn about teacher effectiveness, i.e., a Bayesian learning model along 
the lines of Jovanovic (1979).  This provides us with several testable predictions for the 
relationship between teacher performance data and principals’ prior and posterior beliefs 
regarding teacher effectiveness, all of which are borne out empirically.  First, there is a strong 
relationship between value-added and principals’ baseline evaluations of teacher effectiveness, 
consistent with the earlier work cited above.  Furthermore, as the model would predict, this 
relationship is stronger when value-added estimates and principals’ priors are relatively more 
precise.  Second, principals who are provided with objective performance data incorporate this 
information into their posterior beliefs, and do so to a greater extent when the data are more 
precise and when their priors are less precise.   
 We also investigate several additional potential effects of providing objective 
performance data, though these are outside the scope of our simple theoretical framework.  First, 
we find no evidence that principals responded to the receipt of objective performance data by 
spending less time collecting information through classroom observation.  Second, we find that 
the objective performance estimates changed patterns of teacher turnover—teachers with low 
performance estimates were more likely to exit their schools after this information was provided 
to principals.  These differences in turnover patterns imply small improvements in the 
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productivity of the teachers in the treatment schools, and we find changes in achievement in line 
with these expectations, particularly with respect to math test scores.   These findings contribute 
to our understanding of how managers incorporate information on worker performance into 
evaluation and personnel decisions.  They also suggest that the provision of objective 
performance data on teachers to school principals may be a useful tool for the improvement of 
school quality. 
 In Section 2 we describe the pilot, compare treatment and control groups, present 
descriptive statistics from baseline and follow-up surveys, and describe other sources of data.  In 
Section 3, we discuss our basic theoretical framework to guide our analysis of the impact of the 
treatment.  We examine the relationship between value-added estimates and principals’ prior 
beliefs regarding teacher performance in Section 4, and we estimate impacts of the provision of 
performance data on a variety of outcomes in Sections 5 and 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Teacher Data Initiative 
 The goals of the DOE pilot program were to develop the internal capacity to estimate 
teacher value-added, design and disseminate reports to principals, and train principals to 
understand the methodology and the reports.  Several factors motivated the program.  First, DOE 
officials believed that many principals had limited capacity to access and analyze data, had a 
small scope of comparisons within their schools, and may have lacked training in teacher 
evaluation or even relied on personal biases in their evaluations.  Thus, value-added estimates 
could provide them with new and potentially useful information.  In addition, it was felt that 
principals would have local knowledge regarding student assignment, and that this could help 
them interpret estimates of teacher value-added in the context of any peculiar matching of 
students and teachers.  Third, recent changes to their management and accountability systems 
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had given principals considerable decision-making power and responsibility, and the value-
added reports were seen as a means of empowering principals without imposing choices upon 
them.4 
 It is unclear whether providing objective teacher performance information to principals 
has any impact on their beliefs or actions.  Principals’ subjective evaluations may already 
account for all of the meaningful variation in value-added estimates, or principals might place 
little faith in their accuracy and give them little or no weight when forming opinions or making 
decisions.  In order to understand the impact of this initiative on principals, teachers, and 
students, the DOE piloted the program in a randomized control trial.5   
 In early summer 2007, the DOE identified principals from the school year 2006-2007 
who were expected to be principal at the same school in the coming year and whose school 
contained any of the grades 4 to 8.6  These principals received an e-mail with basic information 
about the initiative, a link to a web site with background on value-added, an invitation to attend 
one of three presentations on the initiative conducted at different locations in the city during the 
summer, and a link to respond if they were interested in participating in the pilot program.   
 Of the roughly 1,000 principals who were sent an invitation, 335 principals expressed 
interest in becoming part of the program and were sent a baseline survey on August 8, 2007.  
                                                 
4 Principals in the DOE had received greater power to allocate financial resources within their schools and purchase 
services as they saw fit, rather than receive services through central administration.  Also, under the DOE 
accountability system, principals could earn bonuses of up to $25,000 and could be removed for poor performance. 
5 Most of the logistical work for the pilot program was conducted by the Battelle Memorial Institute, under contract 
with the DOE. Battelle performed survey data collection, the provision of professional development to principals, 
estimation of teacher value-added and preparation of the value-added reports.  We do not discuss the value-added 
estimation methodology here, but details were provided in a guide to participating principals and available upon 
request from the authors.  The methodology uses linear regression to predict student test scores based on prior 
information, and averages residuals at the teacher level.  Because the standardized tests are taken prior to the end of 
the school year, teachers’ value-added estimates are based partially on test score performance of students in the 
following year.  This partial weighting on next year’s performance is not done for teachers of 8th grade (due to a lack 
of 9th grade test data) or teachers observed for the first time in the most recent year of data. 
6 The DOE also excluded middle schools with known problems in the data linking teachers to students. Schools not 
serving grades 4 to 8 were excluded because students in New York are only tested annually in grades 3 through 8, 
and the methodology used to estimate value-added relied on controls for prior test scores. 
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They were told that a randomly selected subset of principals who completed the survey by 
September 21st would be provided value-added reports and training.  223 principals completed 
the survey, 112 were selected into the treatment group, and the remaining 111 schools constitute 
the control group.  Selection was done by assigning a random number to each school, sorting by 
number within K-8, Middle, and Elementary schools, and selecting the first 12, 27, and 73 
schools in each group, respectively. 
 We compare the average characteristics of treatment and control principals (schools) at 
baseline and test for statistically significant differences (Table 1, left side).  The treatment and 
control groups are very similar with regard to enrollment, principals’ characteristics (work 
experience and demographics), students’ characteristics (poverty, demographics, and 
participation in special programs), and teachers’ opinions of school environment from a citywide 
survey from spring 2007.  Thus, the randomization successfully created comparable groups. 
 Treatment principals were invited to attend a three hour training session to learn about the 
methodology for estimating value-added and to receive reports on their teachers.  Sessions were 
held over several evenings in December 2007.  The first two hours focused on the statistics 
behind value-added estimation, a walk-through of a sample value-added report, and discussion of 
uses of information on value-added.  Principals then received their teachers’ reports, and the 
remaining hour was devoted to answering principals’ questions.  Of the treatment principals, 71 
attended a session in person, while 24 participated in an online session (similar to a conference 
call, but with a presentation viewed via computer), and 1 viewed a session on video.7  The DOE 
did not distribute value-added reports to 16 treatment principals who did not attend or view a 
training session, but these principals are included as part of the treatment group in our analysis. 
                                                 
7 The principals who attended the live/online sessions completed a short survey instrument to provide feedback to 
the DOE.  95 percent of principals attending reported that the session was a valuable use of their time, and over 80 
percent reported that they understood the ‘teacher value-added’ metric and could understand the reports.  
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 A sample value-added data report is included as Appendix Figure 1.  Value-added 
measures were based only on students teachers had taught at their current schools, and were 
calculated separately by grade level.  Multiple reports were distributed for 32 percent of middle 
school teachers and 14 percent of elementary school teachers who had taught multiple grades.  A 
report contained four different value-added measures in each subject (math and/or English).  
Each teacher’s performance was compared to teachers citywide and to teachers with similar 
levels of experience working in classrooms with similar student composition; for each type of 
comparison, value-added was measured based on up to three years of prior data and on just the 
prior year.  A 95 percent confidence interval was reported for all estimates based on the 
estimated variance of the value-added measure.8   
 A follow-up survey was sent to treatment and control principals in late May 2008, to be 
completed by mid-July.  Two treatment principals and one control principal asked to be removed 
from the study and were not sent the follow-up survey.  All other principals were sent the survey, 
including those in the treatment group that did not attend professional development and did not 
receive value-added reports.  Of the 110 treatment principals invited to take the follow-up 
survey, 84 began the survey, 81 completed the teacher evaluations, and 79 completed all survey 
questions; of the 110 control principals invited, 94 began the survey, 93 completed the teacher 
evaluations, and 91 completed all survey questions.  The difference in response rates between the 
groups is partly driven by treatment principals who did not receive reports; only 5 of these 16 
principals completed the follow-up survey. Nevertheless, one might be concerned with 
comparisons of only those treatment and control principals responding to the follow-up survey.   
                                                 
8 The report also presents value-added estimates specific to student subgroups (e.g., English Language Learners, 
Special Education students, students who scored in the bottom third of the school’s distribution in the prior year).  In 
our analysis, we restrict our attention to the value-added estimates based on all students. 
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 To address this concern, we limit our sample to follow-up survey respondents and 
compare treatment and control principals on the same characteristics as the baseline sample 
(Table 1, right side).  Again, we find no significant differences between the two groups.  We 
have also made these comparisons for treatment and control principals who completed the entire 
follow-up survey—some started the survey but did not finish—and, similarly, find no significant 
differences.  Although we can only test for differences in observables, these results support the 
idea that treatment and control principals who responded to the follow-up survey were 
comparable.  Of course, for our analyses of non-survey outcomes (e.g., teacher turnover, student 
test scores), we include all participating schools, regardless of survey response. 
 In order to participate, principals had to volunteer and complete the baseline survey, and 
only about one quarter of eligible principals did so.9  While participation may have been based 
on exogenous factors, like the principal’s availability to attend one of the information sessions 
conducted in summer 2007, it is possible that principals that did not volunteer may have been 
unwilling to use student data to evaluate teachers, or were so steeped in data analysis that the 
reports would have been superfluous.  Conversely, reluctant principals may have been unfamiliar 
with data analysis and had the most potential to learn and (possibly) change their views.  If 
participating principals were significantly different from non-participants, our findings might 
have limited external validity.  Using observable characteristics, we find little evidence that 
participating principals (schools) were substantially different from those serving students in 
grades 4-8 citywide (Table 2). We find a few statistically significant differences, but even these 
appear small.  For example, compared with the citywide population, sample principals had 
slightly more teaching experience (7.2 vs. 6.2 years) and were slightly more likely to be female 
                                                 
9 This level of participation is not unusually low.  For example, roughly one in five eligible schools volunteered to 
participate in Tennessee’s well-known class size reduction experiment, Project STAR. 
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(79 vs. 73 percent).  Moreover, we find no significant differences in their teachers’ views on 
issues such as frequency of classroom observations, the feedback teachers receive from the 
principal, how much the principal prioritizes teaching, or the use of student data in instruction. 
 Several additional factors may be important in interpreting the effects we find for the 
value-added reports in this setting.  First, in the fall of 2007, the DOE launched an accountability 
system which, for elementary and middle schools, was built around student performance on math 
and English exams taken in grades 4-8 (see Rockoff and Turner, forthcoming).  Principals could 
earn bonuses of up to $25,000 for doing well and could be removed for doing poorly under this 
system, and thus had incentives to focus on teacher performance in these grades and subjects.  
On the other hand, the broader political climate may have not been conducive to principals’ use 
of the value-added reports.  The teachers’ union was briefed on the pilot study in the summer of 
2007, did not support it, and filed a formal grievance on the matter at the start of the school year.  
The DOE, partly in response, advised treatment principals when they received the reports that 
they were not to be used for formal teacher evaluation during the pilot year.  Though the 
identities of participating principals were held confidential, the pilot’s existence was well known 
(e.g., it made the front page of the New York Times in January, 2008) and at the request of 
teachers unions, the New York State legislature amended state law in April 2008 so that teachers 
could “not be granted or denied tenure based on student performance data.” 
 Despite union opposition, the DOE expanded dissemination of teacher data reports to all 
elementary and middle schools in December 2008.  Treatment principals received an updated set 
of reports, while control principals received reports for the first time.  This should not affect the 
interpretation of the vast majority of our analysis, since our follow-up survey occurred before the 
expanded dissemination of teacher data reports and, at that time, no one knew if the program 
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would be continued or expanded.  However, we will analyze the impact of the pilot on test scores 
in the spring of 2009.  By this time both treatment and control principals had received value-
added reports, though control school principals had received them only a few months prior and 
likely had little time to act on this information in ways that would impact spring test scores. 
2.1 Baseline and Follow-up Surveys 
 First and foremost, the baseline and follow-up surveys asked principals to evaluate the 
performance of their teachers.  Specifically, principals were given a list of the teachers in their 
schools who (based on DOE records) taught math and/or English to students in grades four 
through eight.  Principals were asked to confirm that each teacher had indeed taught in these 
areas (nearly all teachers were confirmed), and then asked to evaluate each teacher “overall,” and 
then specifically “in terms of raising student achievement” in math or English (or both for 
teachers who taught both subjects).  Principals were directed to compare each teacher to all 
“teachers [they] have known who taught the same grade/subject,” not just to teachers within their 
school or with similar levels of experience.  Evaluations were made on a six point scale: 
Exceptional (top 5%), Very Good (76-95th percentile), Good (51-75th), Fair (26-50th), Poor (6-
25th percentile), or Very Poor (bottom 5%).   
 Descriptive statistics on teachers at baseline are presented in Table 3 (left side).  On a 1-6 
scale, the mean overall evaluation was 4.3, suggesting that principals were more generous with 
their evaluations than indicated by the anchor percentages at each point on the scale.  Indeed, 
over three quarters of the teachers received an overall evaluation indicating above median 
performance (Good, Very Good, or Exceptional), and subject specific evaluations in math and 
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English were only slightly lower on average.10  Nevertheless, the standard deviation of 
evaluations of about 1.1 indicates significant variation in principals’ priors.  In the official 
evaluation system for teachers in the DOE, by contrast, less than 2 percent of teachers are 
evaluated as “Unsatisfactory” per year, and the rest are deemed “Satisfactory.” 
 Notably, the correlation between subject specific evaluations in math and English is quite 
high (0.91) and the correlations between subject specific and overall evaluations was only 
slightly lower (0.87 for math and 0.88 for English).  Nevertheless, the imperfect agreement 
among these evaluations suggests room for nuance in how principals evaluate performance.  We 
explore this issue further in our empirical analysis (Section 4). 
 In addition to evaluations, principals were asked to provide the number of formal 
classroom observations and total classroom observations they had made of each teacher during 
the prior school year.11  This allows us to examine how principals allocate their observational 
time across teachers and whether this allocation is correlated with value-added measures.  We 
also can examine whether the value-added reports affected principals’ time allocation.  On 
average, principals reported doing 2.2 formal observations and 6.4 total observations of each 
teacher during the prior school year.12  Principals reported no formal observations for only 3 
percent of teachers, and no total observations for just 0.4 percent of teachers, but there was 
considerable variance across principals in the frequency of observation. 20 percent of principals 
reported doing no more than four total observations of any teacher in their school, while 15 
percent reported making “more than ten” total observations of every teacher in their school. 
                                                 
10 The percentages given an overall evaluation in each category (from Exceptional to Very Poor) were 13.7, 33.6, 
30.2, 17.2, 3.8, and 1.6, respectively.   
11 Formal observations are part of the official DOE teacher evaluation system.  Untenured teachers in elementary 
and middle schools in the DOE must be formally observed at least twice per year.  Tenured teachers must be 
formally observed once, or can be evaluated via a “performance option” which entails setting goals at the start of the 
school year and submitting a report to the principal at the end of the year on how those goals were met. 
12 To calculate these averages, we coded teachers with “more than ten” observations as having a value of 11.  We 
also use this coding when examining the relationship between value-added measures and observations (Table 6). 
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 The second part of the baseline survey asked principals about measuring teacher 
effectiveness, their use of student test score data, and other issues related to teachers.  For 
example, they were asked about how they assess teachers (outside of classroom observation), 
their views of the potential benefits and problems with measuring teacher performance using 
student test scores, and their ability to attract and retain high quality teachers in their schools.   
 Descriptive statistics on principals’ responses to the second part of the baseline survey 
are provided in Appendix Table A1.13  It is worth noting that 80 percent of treatment and control 
principals stated that they “regularly compare differences in average student growth in test scores 
for different teachers” and over three quarters of each group said that “student performance on 
state tests” was one of the top two factors (beyond classroom observation) they considered when 
assessing the overall effectiveness of their teachers.  Principals’ biggest concern “about using 
average student growth in test scores to inform evaluations of teachers and schools” was that 
“teachers affect important student outcomes, such as behavior, self-esteem, and intellectual 
curiosity, in ways that cannot be measured with standardized tests.”  Thus, principals in both 
groups were already using student test scores to decide which of their teachers were least and 
most effective, though they value other teaching skills that may be missed by standardized tests. 
 It is also noteworthy that more than three quarters of principals “strongly agree” with the 
statement “I know who the more and less effective teachers are in my school,” and over 80 
percent “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement “I am able to retain the most effective 
teachers in my school.” In contrast, less than half the principals “strongly agree” or “agree” with 
the statement “I am able to dismiss ineffective teachers in my school,” and only a quarter did so 
with the statement “anyone can learn to be an effective teacher.”  Thus, it appears that these 
                                                 
13 Appendix Table A1 also tests for differences in treatment and control principals’ responses to the baseline survey. 
Average responses across groups were statistically different at the ten percent level on just 1 of 33 items.   
13 
principals have fairly strong prior beliefs on which teachers are effective and ineffective, they are 
concerned about the continued presence of ineffective teachers in their schools, and they do not 
believe that additional training can lead all of their teachers to become effective. 
 In the follow-up survey, teacher evaluations were followed by questions about the 
evaluation process and the importance of various issues when using students’ standardized test 
scores to assess individual teachers.  Treatment principals were also asked about their confidence 
that the value-added calculations addressed these issues, their opinions on the usefulness of the 
reports, and whether they shared reports with administrators and/or teachers in their school.   
 Descriptive statistics on principals’ responses to the second part of the follow-up survey 
are provided in Appendix Tables A2 and A3.  When asked for the top four factors (other than 
observation) influencing their evaluation of teachers, the most frequent item (cited by 96 percent 
of control principals and 93 percent of treatment principals) was student performance on state 
standardized tests.  Thus, it is fairly certain that these principals would have used test outcomes 
to evaluate teacher effectiveness even without value-added reports.  However, a higher share of 
treatment principals (46 vs. 31 percent) marked state standardized tests as the “top factor” used 
for evaluation other than observation.  Treatment principals were also more likely to claim to 
have used average scores and average score growth on state tests to evaluate or compare 
teachers, and 55 percent of treatment principals said they used the value-added reports to 
evaluate or compare teachers.14 This provides an initial indication that the treatment changed the 
set of information principals incorporated into their evaluations.    
 Finally, treatment principals’ confidence in whether the value-added methodology 
controlled for various factors largely accords with reality (see Table A3).  For example, 
                                                 
14 If we limit the follow-up survey sample to those treatment principals who actually received value-added reports, 
66 percent reported using them to evaluate or compare teachers.  
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principals were confident that the methodology accounted for factors like teaching experience, 
prior test scores, and class size (all of which were control variables) and expressed little 
confidence that the methodology accounted for factors like the presence of a classroom aide or 
whether a teacher’s students received outside help (neither of which were control variables).15   
2.2 Other Data Sources 
 In addition to the surveys, we use data from the value-added reports, which exist for all 
schools in the city (even though only treatment principals received them).  In order to be familiar 
to principals, value-added measures were reported in “proficiency rating units,” a scale based on 
state examinations and used by the DOE in its school accountability system.  However, we 
normalize them (at the city level) to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one for 
purposes of our evaluation.  Average teacher value-added estimates at baseline for treatment and 
control groups were close to zero (see Table 3, left side), suggesting participating schools was 
similar to other schools in the DOE on average.  The variance of value-added estimates was 
higher for those based on one year of data than for those using up to three, and higher for 
estimates that do not adjust for years of teaching experience relative to those that do.  Variation 
in value-added was also smaller for English than math, consistent with studies in New York and 
elsewhere (see Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) for a review).  In addition to value-added estimates 
and confidence intervals, these data contain a categorical variable for years of teaching 
experience.  Roughly half of the teachers had at least five years of experience, while about one 
third had less than three years of experience.   
                                                 
15 Still, it is interesting that around 25 percent of treatment principals did not express confidence that the 
methodology accounted for issues such as teaching experience and prior test scores. Additionally, a small fraction of 
principals (between 5 and 10 percent) were confident that the methodology accounted for factors which were not 
controlled for, such as whether a teacher had a personal issue or whether students were distracted on the day of the 
test by construction noise.  
15 
 Human resources records provide us with information on whether a teacher switched to 
another school within the DOE or left the DOE’s teacher workforce.  Roughly 89 percent of the 
teachers in the baseline survey still worked in the DOE in the school year 2007-2008, and 85 
percent were teaching in the same school.  Roughly 82 percent still worked in the DOE in the 
school year 2008-2009, and 75 percent were teaching in the same school.16 
 Finally, we have student level data on test scores for the school year 2008-2009 and 
demographics (i.e., gender, race/ethnicity, free lunch receipt, English language learner, and 
special education status).  These data also contain links to the students’ math and English 
teachers.  Thus, we can determine whether a teacher is still providing instruction in the same 
grades and/or subject, ask whether the treatment had an impact on student achievement, and test 
whether value-added estimates made in the summer of 2007 had predictive power for students’ 
learning gains on tests taken in 2009. Only 58 percent of teachers in our baseline sample were 
teaching math or English to students in grades 4 to 8 in the same school in the school year 2008-
2009. 
3. Theoretical Framework: The Bayesian Learning Model 
 We use a simple Bayesian learning model to consider the principal’s evaluation problem.  
Principals accumulate information regarding the effectiveness of their teachers and use this 
information to construct their beliefs.  At time t, the principal has formed a prior belief regarding 
the true effectiveness of each teacher, assumed to be normal distributed (Equation 1).  The mean 
of the prior, µ0, is the expected value and, empirically, is akin to the evaluation provided by the 
principal in our baseline survey.  The parameter h0 is the precision of the prior (i.e., the inverse 
                                                 
16 Turnover in treatment schools was slightly higher than in control schools (about four percentage points higher for 
each observed event, see Table 3). These differences, in particular those occurring before random assignment, may 
be due to differences in observed teacher effectiveness.  We return to this point later in the paper. 
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of its variance) and depends on how much information the principal has accumulated, with more 
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 Between time t and t+1, the principal’s expectation of true teacher effectiveness will 
change based on the accumulation of new information (e.g., through classroom observation).  
Thus, all principals (including those in our control group) may change their evaluations over 
time.  Equation 2 describes the posterior expectation of teacher effectiveness for treatment and 
control principals, where ε is the information routinely accumulated between periods and V is the 
value-added estimate provided to treatment principals, i.e., an imperfect signal of teacher 
effectiveness to which the principal would otherwise not have had access.17   




















































 It is straightforward to show that this simple model yields two intuitive predictions for 
our empirical work: 
 Prediction 1:  Value-added estimates (V) should be correlated with principals’ prior 
beliefs (µ0), since both are signals of teacher effectiveness.  This correlation should be stronger 
when value-added estimates and prior beliefs are more precise (i.e., greater values of hV and h0).   
 
 Prediction 2: Conditional on principals’ prior beliefs (µ0), treatment principals’ 
posterior beliefs regarding teacher effectiveness should, relative to control principals, place 
more weight on value-added estimates and less weight on prior beliefs.  Treatment principals 
should place more weight on value-added estimates with greater precision (hV), and less weight 
on value-added estimates when their priors are more precise.  Principals’ posterior beliefs in the 
control group may also be conditionally correlated with value-added estimates, to the extent that 
value added is correlated with the new information gathered between surveys by all principals. 
                                                 
17 Note we have assumed that the error components of the principal’s prior belief and the value-added estimate are 
independent.  Relaxing this assumption does not affect the qualitative implications of the model, but an increase the 
correlation of these error components essentially reduces the extent to which value-added provides new information.   
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 We use principals’ baseline evaluations to measure prior beliefs (µ0), principals’ follow-
up evaluations to measure posterior beliefs (µ1), estimates from the value-added reports to 
measure V, and the confidence intervals given in the value-added reports to measure hV.  
Unfortunately, we do not have a readily available measure of the precision of principals’ prior 
beliefs (h0).  We therefore proxy for h0 in our analysis using data on the number of years during 
which the principal had observed the teacher.18   
 The model does not give clear predictions for the actions that treatment principals might 
take in reaction to the value-added information they receive.  However, there are several 
reasonable hypotheses that we can test with the available data.  First, the provision of value-
added information may crowd out information gathering by treatment principals.  For simplicity 
we did not model information collection as a choice, but if classroom observation is costly, then 
treatment principals could respond to the provision of value-added by observing teachers less 
frequently—the marginal benefit of an additional classroom observation on the principal’s 
posterior belief will be smaller when the principal has more precise information from other 
sources.   Second, it is reasonable to believe that providing value-added information may create a 
stronger relationship between value-added estimates and teacher turnover, particularly through 
changes in principals’ posterior beliefs.  Also, along the lines of Baker et al. (1994), value-added 
estimates could also lower the cost to principals of acting on existing beliefs, by providing 
independent and verifiable confirmation of their priors.  Finally, if value-added information 
causes changes in turnover or resource allocation that improve overall educational quality (e.g., 
                                                 
18 While we lack complete data on teachers’ work histories, we know the number of years each teacher has been 
working in the value-added subjects/grades in his/her current school and the number of years the principal has been 
working in the current school.  To measure the number of years during which the principal had likely observed the 
teacher, we take the minimum of these two variables.  We do know teachers’ total years of experience, but this is 
likely to overestimate experience within a school for a large fraction of teachers. 
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through selective retention or additional training), we might expect to see student achievement 
rise in treatment schools, relative to control schools. 
4. Value-added Estimates and Principals’ Priors 
 To test Prediction 1 from our framework, we measure the relationship between value-
added estimates and principals’ prior beliefs using a series of linear regressions.  First, we 
estimate a series of specifications where a baseline evaluation given to teacher i (Ri) is regressed 
on a teacher’s value-added estimate (Vi), as shown in Equation 3.   
(3) 
iii
VR εβα ++=  
For easy interpretation, principal evaluations and value-added estimates are normalized to have a 
mean of zero and standard deviation of one.  In specifications that pool across math and English, 
we average the subject-specific value-added estimates and principal evaluations for teachers of 
both subjects.  Standard errors are clustered by school.     
 As expected, principals’ pre-experimental evaluations of a teacher’s overall performance 
are significantly higher for teachers with higher value-added estimates (Table 4, Panel A). We 
estimate similar effect sizes (0.21 to 0.23) using multi-year estimates that compare teachers to 
their peers (i.e., those with similar experience and similar classrooms of students), single year 
estimates that compare teachers to peers, and multi-year estimates that compare teachers 
citywide (Columns 1 to 3).  We then run “horse races” between different value-added estimates 
to test the relative strength of their relationship to principals’ evaluations.  Multi-year estimates 
dominate estimates based only on only the past year of student performance (Column 4), and 
multi-year estimates using the peer comparison are also stronger predictors of evaluations than 
those based on citywide comparisons.  Though both are statistically significant when included 
together in the regression (Column 5), the conditional relationship between citywide value-added 
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and principals’ priors disappears if we control for teacher experience (Column 6).19  In the 
remainder of our analysis, we measure value-added using the multi-year peer comparison 
estimate; the conditional correlation between this measure and principals’ priors is robust to 
controlling for principal fixed effects (Column 7). 
 We find very similar results when we replace the principal’s overall evaluation of the 
teacher with the evaluation of the teacher’s ability to raise student achievement in math and/or 
English (Table 4, Panel B).  Though all these results are qualitatively similar, the point estimates 
on value-added are slightly larger.  For example, when controlling for principals fixed effects 
and experience (Columns 7 and 14), the value-added coefficient is 0.25 for evaluations of overall 
performance and 0.27 for evaluations of performance in raising achievement. This suggests that 
principals may distinguish between performance in raising student achievement from other 
aspects of the job, and we explore this notion further below.20   
 We also find the coefficients on value-added are all positive and significant if we run 
these baseline regressions splitting the sample across teachers of math, English, or both math and 
English (Table 5).  The effect size for teachers of only math is roughly 0.38 for both evaluations 
of overall performance and raising student achievement, noticeably larger than our pooled 
estimates.  Also, for teachers of only English, the effect size for overall performance evaluations 
(0.16) is noticeably smaller than our baseline estimates and somewhat smaller than the estimate 
when we consider evaluations for raising student achievement (0.22).  This provides some 
suggestive evidence that principals’ views of teachers’ overall contributions are more aligned 
                                                 
19 Coefficient estimates on experience indicators are not reported but are available upon request. Conditional on 
value-added, principals’ baseline evaluations were lowest for teachers who just completed their first year, and 
highest for teachers with three to nine years of experience, while teachers with only a few years of experience or ten 
or more years of experience tend to be rated in the middle. 
20 While we pool treatment and control groups for power, these baseline findings are not substantially or statistically 
different if we limit the sample to one group.  For example, in the specification shown in Column 14, the value-
added coefficient is 0.277 for the treatment group only (standard error 0.029, 1,324 observations) and 0.263 for the 
control group only (standard error 0.044, 1,184 observations). 
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with student achievement on statewide standardized exams for math than for English in later 
grades when students receive instruction in these subjects from different teachers.  However, 
among teachers of both subjects (who generally teach lower grade levels), the effect sizes were 
larger for value-added estimates in English than for math, either when estimated separately 
(Columns 3, 4, 8, and 9) or together in the same regression (Columns 5 and 10).  Thus, on the 
whole, principals’ prior beliefs were not clearly tied more strongly to one of the two subject 
areas. 
 Principals’ evaluations of teachers’ “overall” performance and performance in “raising 
student achievement” are very highly but imperfectly correlated (0.87).  To explore the 
distinctions between these different evaluations and their relationship with value-added, we first 
regress the principals’ evaluation of overall performance on value-added while controlling for a 
principal’s evaluation of a teacher’s ability to raise student achievement.  Here, the coefficient on 
value-added is very close to zero and insignificant (Table 6, Column 1).  In contrast, if we 
regress the principals’ evaluation of a teacher’s ability to raise student achievement on value-
added while controlling for a principal’s evaluation of overall performance, the coefficient on 
value-added is positive (0.054) and highly significant (Table 6, Column 2).  Thus, principals do 
indeed distinguish between a teacher’s performance on improving standardized test outcomes 
and other aspects of job performance, even though these performances are highly correlated. 
 For teachers of both math and English, the principal’s evaluation of performance in 
raising math achievement is very highly but imperfectly correlated (0.91) with the evaluation for 
raising English.  This motivates us to explore whether principal evaluations that are specific to 
math and English capture important subject specific elements of teacher effectiveness (as 
opposed to general teaching skills) and whether these are related to value-added.  To do so, we 
21 
restrict our sample to teachers who provide both math and English instruction and estimate the 
specifications shown in Equations 4a and 4b; where k and j subscripts denote different subjects.   
 (4a) ijij
jj
ikij VRR εβπα +++=  
(4b) ijik
jk
ikij VRR εβπα +++=  
If both the principals evaluations (R) and value-added (V) truly measure subject-specific teaching 
performance, then our estimate of jjβ should be positive and significant while our estimate of 
jkβ  should be close to zero.  In other words, conditional on the principal’s evaluation in subject 
k, the principal’s evaluation in subject j should be related to value-added in subject j and not 
related to value-added in subject k.  
 This is precisely what we find (Table 6, Columns 3 to 6).  For math evaluations, the 
coefficient on math value-added is positive and statistically significant (0.028), but the 
coefficient on English value-added is small and insignificant (-.007).  Likewise, when English 
evaluation is the dependent variable the coefficient on English value-added is positive and 
statistically significant (0.049), but the coefficient on math value-added is small (0.017) and 
insignificant.  Thus, despite being highly correlated across subjects, both subjective evaluations 
and objective performance estimates are sensitive to teachers doing well in a particular subject.  
 Having established a consistent baseline relationship between value-added and 
principals’ performance evaluations, we proceed to test the additional elements of Prediction 1.  
First, the relationship between principals’ priors and value-added estimates should be greater 
when the estimates have greater precision.  To test this prediction, we add an interaction between 
the value-added estimate and a measure of its precision (hV)—the inverse of the confidence 
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interval provided to principals on the value-added report.21   Consistent with the Bayesian 
learning model, value-added estimates are more strongly correlated with principals’ priors when 
those estimates have tighter confidence intervals (Table 7).  Our estimates of the interaction of 
value-added and precision are positive and highly significant, and very similar regardless of 
whether we use the principal’s overall evaluation (Columns 1 to 3) or evaluation of the teacher’s 
ability to raise student achievement (Columns 4 to 6), or whether we control for teacher 
experience and school fixed effects (Columns 2 and 5).  One concern with this specification is 
that teachers for whom more years of data are used to generate their value-added estimates will 
tend to have smaller confidence intervals, and, even conditional on total teaching experience, 
these teachers are more effective.  However, controlling for the number of years of data used in 
the teacher’s value-added estimate has little impact on our estimates (Columns 3 and 6).22   
 To measure the strength of the principals’ priors, we adjust our basic regression 
specification in several ways.  First, we place the value-added estimate as the dependent variable 
and the principal’s evaluation as an independent variable. We also interact the evaluation with 
the years of experience the principal has, and limit the sample to teachers with three years of 
value-added, i.e., teachers for whom we are sure they have worked in the school for at least three 
years.  More experienced principals’ evaluations are based on more information than those made 
by principals with less experience, and we would therefore expect a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term.  In other words, when it comes to predicting the value-added of experienced 
teachers, new principals should not be as accurate as experienced principals.   
                                                 
21 We find very similar results to those described here if we use an interaction with the inverse of the variance of the 
value-added estimate, which is technically the correct measure of precision.  However, we use the inverse of the 
confidence interval later in our analysis to test Prediction 2 because the confidence interval is what was actually 
provided to principals in the value-added report. We therefore also use it here for consistency.  
22 Another concern may be that the most precise estimates are for teachers of only math, and in Table 5 we showed 
that value-added was a stronger predictor of principals’ evaluations for these teachers.  However, we find positive 
and significant interactions of value-added estimates with their precision in regressions that separately examine 
teachers by subject areas taught. 
23 
 The empirical results are in line with this expectation and the Bayesian learning model.  
Both the main effect of principals’ evaluations and the interaction with principal experience are 
positive and statistically significant (Table 8).  Using principals’ overall evaluations, we find a 
main effect of 0.151 and an interaction of 0.011 (Column 1).  If we use evaluations of teachers’ 
ability to raise student achievement, we get slightly larger point estimates (0.158 and 0.015, 
Column 4).  One potential issue with this specification is that very experienced teachers may 
have taught other subjects or grade levels, or may simply have variation in their performance that 
is not captured by the available value-added estimate (based on three years of data) but would 
have been observed by a very experienced principal.  We therefore might expect to find a larger 
coefficient on the interaction of the principal’s evaluation and principal experience when we 
limit the sample to teachers with fewer years of experience.  This is indeed the case, with 
interaction terms growing as we remove teachers with 10 or more years of experience (Columns 
2 and 5) and, teachers with 5 or more years of experience (Columns 3 and 6).23  Thus, this 
element of Prediction 1 is well borne out by the data, though it is unfortunate that we did not 
solicit more direct measures of the precision of principals’ prior beliefs. 
  Finally, we examine how the frequency of principals’ observations is related to teachers’ 
value-added estimates.  To do so, we estimate regressions of the form shown in Equation 3, but 
with observation frequency as the dependent variable.24  We find that principals more frequently 
observe teachers with lower value-added estimates (Table 9, Columns 1 and 4).  There are 
several reasons why observational frequency and value-added may be related in this way.  First, 
                                                 
23 We also estimated a specification that interacted principals’ evaluations with an indicator for whether the principal 
strongly agreed with the statement “I know who the most effective teachers are in my school” in the baseline survey. 
While this interaction is positive, as we would predict, it was small and statistically insignificant.  This lack of 
power may not be surprising, given that three-quarters of the principals in our sample strongly agreed with the 
statement about the extent of their knowledge.   
24 There are a few teachers for whom the principal reported only the number of formal observations and left the 
question on total observations blank.  The results are insensitive to dropping these teachers from our regression of 
formal observation frequency. 
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if one of the main goals of observation is to identify ineffective teachers, principals may spend 
more time observing teachers they believe are performing poorly in order to gain a more precise 
evaluation.  Second, observation may also be used to provide constructive criticism to help 
teachers improve, so that, again, observation is skewed towards low performing teachers. 
 We estimate a few additional specifications predicting observation frequency.  First, we 
find that the inclusion of experience has little impact on the coefficient on value-added estimates, 
though the coefficients on teacher experience (not reported but available upon request) show that 
principals reduce the frequency of their observations as teachers gain more experience (Columns 
2 and 5).  Adding principal fixed effects (Columns 3 and 6) also has little impact on this finding, 
though standard errors decrease substantially in the regression of total observations.  Finally, the 
value-added coefficients shrink considerably if we include the principal’s overall evaluation as a 
control variable (Columns 4 and 8).  Thus, the relationship between observation frequency and 
value-added is mediated by principals’ prior beliefs on teacher effectiveness. 
5. The Impact of Information on Employee Evaluation  
 Our primary prediction for the impact of information is that principals should place more 
weight on value-added estimates and less weight on prior beliefs.  To test this, we estimate 






The evaluation given to teacher i at time t+1 (Rit+1) is specified as a function of the teacher’s 
prior evaluation (Rit), the value-added estimate (Vit) and a disturbance term (εit).  We estimate 
regressions for treatment and control groups separately and compare their coefficients.  
 The results are in line with our prediction that providing value-added estimates to 
principals had a significant impact on the formation of posterior beliefs.  We find a highly 
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significant positive effect of value-added on post-experimental evaluations for the treatment 
group (0.123) and a small and insignificant effect (0.017) for the control group (Table 10, 
Column Group 1).  When we include principal fixed effects, the coefficient on value-added 
estimates for the control group rises slightly (0.038) and becomes marginally significant (p-value 
0.14), but the coefficient for the treatment group rises by a similar amount (to 0.149) and the 
difference between the coefficients remains statistically significant (Column Group 2).  The 
coefficients on prior evaluation are both positive and significant for both groups.  While the 
estimates for the treatment group is smaller (e.g., 0.793 vs. 0.824 in Column Group 1) the 
differences across the two groups are not significant and insensitive to controlling teacher 
experience and school fixed effects. 
 The Bayesian learning model predicts that principals would place relatively more weight 
on value-added reports that were relatively more precise and less weight on value-added 
estimates for the teachers for whom they had a relatively precise prior.  To test this, we interact 
both value-added and the principal’s prior evaluation with (a) our measure of the value-added 
estimate’s precision and (b) the number of years the teacher had been under the principal’s 
supervision.25  As predicted, for the treatment group we find a significant positive interaction of 
value-added with precision and a significant negative interaction of value-added with the number 
of years the principal has supervised the teacher.  Also, as predicted, we find a negative and 
marginally significant (p-value 0.11) interaction of the principal’s prior evaluation with the 
precision of value-added and a significant positive interaction of the prior evaluation with the 
number of years the principal has supervised the teacher.  In contrast, the interaction coefficients 
                                                 
25 This is based on the minimum of the number of years the principal has been at the school and the number of years 
of data from the current school used to construct the teacher’s value-added estimate.  Unfortunately we do not have 
information on teaching experience within the school, and our measure of total DOE experience is likely to 
misclassify many experienced teachers who have changed schools.   
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for the control group are all much closer to zero, never even marginally significant, and 
sometimes of a different sign.  These results are also robust to the addition of teacher experience 
and school fixed effects.  
 Thus, our findings are quite consistent with the predictions of the simple learning model.  
Principals who receive performance data on their teachers use this information in updating their 
priors.  They put more weight on the new data and less on their priors when the data is more 
precise (i.e., greater values of hV), and less weight on new data and more on their priors when 
their priors are more precise (i.e., greater values of h0). 
 As in our examination of principal’s priors, we also examine the influence of value-added 
on principals’ posterior evaluations separately for teachers of math, English, and both math and 
English.  Here we find consistent evidence that the value-added estimates in math were more 
influential than those for English (Table 11).  Specifically, we find positive significant effects of 
math value-added on principals’ posterior evaluations for teachers of math and for teachers of 
math and English for the treatment group, while the control group estimates are significantly 
smaller and not distinguishable from zero (Column Groups 1, 3, and 5).  Meanwhile, we find no 
significant effects of English value-added estimates on principals’ posterior beliefs, and the 
coefficient estimates in the treatment and control groups are very similar (Column Groups 2, 4, 
and 6).  Why principals were more influenced by the value-added reports in their evaluation of 
math teaching is unclear.  It is possible that the timing of the English exam—given in January, as 
opposed to math which is given in April—increased principals’ concerns about the ability of the 
value-added methodology to accurately measure an individual teacher’s contribution to student 
achievement.  It may also be that principals were more confident in their ability to gauge the 
quality of English instruction, and therefore put less weight on the value-added estimates.   
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6. Information Acquisition, Worker Turnover, and Productivity 
 The results presented in Section 5 establish the impact of information provision on 
principals’ subjective evaluations of work performance.  However, it is unclear how changes in 
principals’ beliefs regarding teacher effectiveness translated into changes in personnel decisions 
or the quality of education provided at the school.  In this section, we ask whether providing 
information on employee performance causes principals to gather less information via classroom 
observation, changes patterns of turnover, or raises student achievement. 
 
6.1 Information Crowd-out 
 Principals have many duties besides teacher evaluation, and a policy that provides them 
with data on teacher performance may crowd out time and energy spent on observing teachers in 
the classroom.  In the context of the pilot we study, we can look for evidence of crowd-out in the 
short run, i.e., value-added reports were received in December and the follow-up survey asked 
principals about formal and total observations of each teacher during the pilot year.  However, if 
we estimate regressions of formal or total observations (either levels or changes from the 
baseline survey) on an indicator for treatment, we find no evidence of crowd-out (Table 12).  In 
other regressions, not reported but available upon request, we found no significant interaction 
between treatment status and value-added, or between treatment status and the principal’s 
baseline evaluation.   
6.2 Employee Turnover 
 Given that value-added information did affect performance evaluations, one of the 
channels through which we might expect to see change occur is through selective retention of 
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teachers.  We therefore examine how the propensity of teachers to exit their schools after the 
pilot year was related to their value-added estimates, and whether this relationship differed 
between treatment and control schools.  We use two regression specifications, shown by 
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is an indicator for whether teacher i is no longer employed in the same school at time t+1, 
Vit is the teacher’s value-added estimate at baseline, Rit is the principal’s evaluation at baseline, 
and εit+1 and ζit+1 are disturbance terms.  Since our dependent variable is binary, we present 
results using both linear regression and logit specifications, though our results are quite similar 
across the two estimation methods.  As with our analysis of principals’ post-experimental 
evaluations, we run regressions separately for treatment and control groups and then test for 
differences between the groups.  Again, standard errors are clustered by school. 
   We find clear evidence that providing the value-added reports did indeed cause teachers 
with lower value-added estimates to be more likely to exit treatment schools (Table 13).  The 
coefficient on value-added is statistically significant and negative in the treatment group, and we 
can reject the equality of the treatment and control coefficients at the 11 percent level for OLS 
and the 12 percent level for the logit regression (Column Groups 1 and 4).  When we include the 
principal’s prior evaluation of the teacher (Column Groups 2 and 5), the value-added coefficients 
remain significant and negative for the treatment group and we can reject equality with the 
control group at the 6 percent level in both types of regressions.  The coefficient on the 
principal’s prior evaluation is negative for both groups, but is significantly larger for the control 
group.  Thus, as with our analysis of posterior evaluations, we find treatment principals putting 
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more weight on new information and less weight on their prior beliefs.  These results are robust 
to including teacher experience and school fixed effects (Column Groups 3 and 6).26 
 While we recognize that employment is not a subject specific outcome, we also 
separately analyze the impact of value-added on employment by subject due to our results on 
principals’ posterior beliefs, which were stronger in math than English.  Similarly, we find that 
the negative impact of value-added on turnover was driven by value-added in math, not English 
(Table 14).  This provides further evidence that the provision of performance data was used by 
principals in forming beliefs about job performance and continued employment. 
6.3 Student Achievement 
 There are two channels through which the provision of objective performance data could 
have raised productivity in treatment schools.  First, if the value-added estimates are valid 
predictors of how teachers will perform in the future, the results on turnover suggest that we 
might see a slight increase in student achievement, particularly in math, due to selective 
retention.  Second, principals may use the information to provide low performing teachers with 
additional resources and training, though we have no data by which to assess this channel. 
 To estimate the overall effect of the treatment on student achievement, we estimate a 
student-level regression of achievement gains (i.e., 2009 score minus 2008 score) on an indicator 
for being in the treatment group.  We allow for random effects at the school and teacher level to 
account for the nested structure of the data.  Our estimate of the treatment effect in math 
(Column 1 of Table 15) is positive, small (0.024 student level standard deviations) and 
                                                 
26 As a further check, we examined the probability that a teacher exited the school before the start of the pilot (i.e., 
between the school years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008).  These “placebo tests” showed a very similar and insignificant 
relationship between value-added and exiting the school for treatment and control schools, while the coefficients on 
principals’ pre-existing beliefs regarding teacher effectiveness were negative, significant, and very similar for the 
two groups.  This supports the notion that principals make personnel decisions based on their subjective evaluations 
of job performance, and did this similarly in treatment and control schools prior to the start of the pilot. 
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marginally significant (p-value 0.16).  This estimate is insensitive to controlling for teacher 
experience (Column 2) or student level and grade level covariates (Column 3).27   
It is important to note that, among the students in treatment and control schools for whom 
2008-2009 test score gains were available, fewer than half were taught by a teacher who was 
evaluated in the pilot’s baseline survey, due to turnover and reassignment (to non-tested grades 
or subjects) within the school.  When we limit our sample to students taught by teachers in the 
pilot study, the point estimate for the treatment group rises to 0.04 and has a p-value of 0.10 
(Column 4).  Thus, achievement gains produced by retained teachers were higher in the 
treatment schools than in the control schools.  When we include principals’ overall evaluations 
of teachers at baseline as a covariate (Column 5) we find it has a positive significant coefficient 
(0.074) and that the treatment effect estimate rises to 0.057 (p-value 0.04).  In other words, 
among teachers from the pilot who were still in the value-added grades and subjects, those in the 
treated group were originally rated worse, on average, than those in the control group.  This is 
consistent with the notion that positive signals from the value-added caused treatment principals 
to keep some teachers of whom they held a low opinion, and that negative signals from the 
value-added caused them to dismiss some teachers of whom they had a (relatively) high opinion.  
In further support of this notion, when we control for the value-added estimates themselves—
which also have a positive and significant coefficient— the treatment coefficient shrinks back to 
0.044 (p-value 0.09).  That is, conditional on the principals baseline opinion, treatment school 
teachers still providing math instruction in these grades had higher value-added than control 
school teachers. 
                                                 
27 Student characteristics include: prior test score, prior test score interacted with grade level, prior test score in the 
other subject (e.g.., reading when predicting math gains), student gender, racial/ethnic subgroup, English language 
learner status, special education status, and eligibility for free or reduced price lunch.  Grade level covariates include 
grade fixed effects interacted with the grade configuration of the school (e.g., grade 6 student in middle schools). 
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Given the results of earlier sections, it is not surprising that we find no evidence of 
significant changes in student achievement in English (Columns 7 to 12).  The point estimates on 
the treatment effect are never even marginally significant and change signs.  However, the 
coefficients on principals’ baseline evaluations and teachers’ value-added estimates are both 
positive and highly significant.  This suggests that both measures are, as we posited in our 
conceptual framework, imperfect but useful estimates of teacher effectiveness. 28 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we take advantage of a unique experiment conducted in the New York City 
public schools to learn about how managers evaluate employee job performance and how 
objective performance data influences this process.  We frame our analysis in the context of a 
Bayesian learning model; school principals learn about the effectiveness of their teachers using 
imperfect information, and can be aided by the provision of “value-added” measures that 
estimate teacher performance using standardized achievement test scores.   
Our empirical analysis presents several facts that are consistent with this model.  First, 
value-added and principals’ prior beliefs about teacher effectiveness are positively correlated.  
Second, this relationship is stronger when value-added measures are more precisely estimated or 
when the principal has supervised the teacher for a longer period of time—our proxy for the 
precision of principals’ prior beliefs.  Third, principals change their evaluations of teachers in 
response to information on value-added, a fact we are able to document due to the randomized 
selection of principals who received information.  Fourth, the impact of providing information is 
greater when value-added estimates are more precise and smaller when principals have already 
                                                 
28 Note that if we estimate these coefficients separately for treatment and control schools, they are always positive 
and significant in both subjects, and are not statistically distinguishable across the two groups. 
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supervised their teachers for a greater number of years.  We also find that teachers with lower 
value-added estimates are more likely to exit teaching in the school after the principal receives 
this information, and we find small, marginally significant improvements in test scores that are 
consistent with these changes in selective retention. 
Overall, our results consistently show that objective job performance data can be useful 
to managers in forming subjective evaluations of employee job performance and raising 
workforce productivity.  However, in the context of public schools, it is also interesting to 
consider how the privacy of this information affects its usefulness as a policy tool.  In the pilot 
program we study, the value-added reports constituted private information for the principal who 
received them, and many of the teachers with low value-added estimates that exited treatment 
schools found another teaching job within the school district.  Boyd et al. (2007), also studying 
schools in New York City, find that low value-added teachers who transfer schools continue to 
perform poorly, suggesting that private information on teacher performance contributes to the 
continued employment of poor performing teachers, a process often described as the “dance of 
the lemons” by education professionals (see Ravitch (2007)).  If the value-added reports contain 
information useful to principals about their current teachers, we speculate they might provide 
useful information to principals considering applicants who previously worked in other schools. 
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Total Enrollment 705 717.8 12.3 0.79 715 724.9 9.7 0.85
Principal Characteristics
     Years of Experience as Principal (in School) 3.3 3.2 -0.1 0.81 3.2 3.2 0.0 0.98
     Years of Experience as Assistant Principal 2.4 2.7 0.3 0.40 2.4 2.8 0.3 0.43
     Years of Experience as Teacher 6.8 7.6 0.8 0.36 6.6 7.8 1.2 0.18
     Years of Experience in School (Any Position) 4.4 5.1 0.7 0.31 4.4 4.8 0.5 0.53
     Principal Age 48.0 48.8 0.8 0.50 48.2 49.9 1.7 0.16
     Principal is Black or Hispanic 48.6% 41.9% -6.7% 0.32 47.9% 44.1% -3.8% 0.61
     Principal is Female 81.1% 77.7% -3.4% 0.53 80.9% 77.4% -3.5% 0.57
Student Characteristics (Grades 4-8)
     On Free Lunch 87% 85.4% -1.2% 0.64 85.7% 85.0% -0.7% 0.81
     English Language Learners 15% 13.3% -1.4% 0.30 14.7% 13.0% -1.7% 0.30
     In Special Education 10% 9.8% 0.3% 0.79 9.2% 10.2% 1.0% 0.40
     Black 72% 72.8% 0.5% 0.91 71.9% 72.9% 1.0% 0.83
     Hispanic 29% 31.8% 2.5% 0.52 30.2% 31.0% 0.8% 0.85
School Environment (Teacher Survey, Spring 2007)
     The Principal…
       Visits Classrooms to Observe the Quality of Teaching 0.071 -0.03 -0.101 0.44 0.091 -0.026 -0.117 0.44
       Gives Me Regular and Helpful Feedback -0.047 -0.069 -0.022 0.86 -0.026 -0.101 -0.075 0.59
       Places a High Priority on the Quality of Teaching -0.027 0.004 0.031 0.80 -0.031 0.034 0.065 0.64
     Teachers in this School…
       Use Student Data to Improve Instructional Decisions 0.096 0.077 -0.019 0.87 0.093 0.058 -0.035 0.80
       Receive Training in the Use of Student Data 0.036 0.022 -0.014 0.90 0.049 0.012 -0.037 0.79
Note: P-values indicate the statistical significance of a treatment indicator to predict the survey response.  All variables from the school environment survey have been 
normalized using all schools in New York City to have mean zero and standard deviation one.  Four schools (one control, three treatment), are missing environment 
survey outcomes, due to the fact that teachers in these schools did not complete the survey.
Table 1: Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups at Baseline and Follow-up Surveys
Baseline (112 Treatment, 111 Control) Followup (84 Treatment, 94 Control)
City Sample
P-value on Test of 
Equality
Number of Principals/Schools 1092 223
Average School Enrollment 660 712 0.03
Principal Characteristics
     Years of Experience as School's Principal 3.6 3.3 0.27
     Years of Experience in School (Any Position) 5.2 4.7 0.17
     Years of Experience as Assistant Principal (Any School) 2.7 2.5 0.41
     Years of Experience as Teacher (Any School) 6.2 7.2 0.01
     Principal Age 48.8 48.4 0.41
     Principal is Black or Hispanic 47.7% 45.3% 0.47
     Principal is Female 73.4% 79.4% 0.05
Student Characteristics
     On Free Lunch 84.9% 86.1% 0.35
     Black or Hispanic 75.6% 72.5% 0.11
     English Language Learners 11.5% 14.0% 0.00
     In Special Education 13.8% 9.6% 0.00
Teaching Environment (Spring 2007)
     The Principal…
       Visits Classrooms to Observe the Quality of Teaching 0.00 0.03 0.65
       Gives Me Regular and Helpful Feedback 0.00 -0.05 0.47
       Places a High Priority on the Quality of Teaching 0.00 -0.02 0.72
     Teachers in this School…
       Use Student Data to Improve Instructional Decisions 0.00 0.00 0.99
       Receive Training in the Use of Student Data 0.00 -0.01 0.90
Note: Standard deviations of continuous variables shown in parentheses below mean values. P-values indicate the 
statistical significance of a treatment indicator to predict the survey response.  All variables from the environment 
survey have been normalized using the citywide distribution to have mean zero and standard deviation one.  Four 
sample schools (one control, three treatment) and 72 schools citywide are missing environment survey outcomes, 
due to the fact that teachers in these schools did not complete the survey.
Table 2: Average Characteristics of Study Sample and Schools Citywide Serving Grades 3-8
Table 3: Summary Statistics on Teacher Level Variables
Control Treatment Control Treatment
In Baseline Survey with Value Added Estimate 1184 1324 780 747
Principal's Rating (Scale from 1 to 6)
    Overall 4.32 4.31 4.51 4.57
(1.11) (1.12) (1.04) (1.06)
     Math Instruction 4.21 4.23 4.46 4.50
(1.09) (1.13) (0.99) (1.03)
     ELA Instruction 4.21 4.19 4.45 4.43
(1.04) (1.13) (1.02) (1.03)
Observations Made by Principal Last Year
      Formal 2.21 2.24 1.92 1.98
(1.26) (1.25) (0.99) (1.26)
     Total 6.51 6.26 4.92 4.75
(3.38) (3.21) (3.27) (3.13)
Value-added Estimates
     Math, Multi-year, City Comparison 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.015
(0.166) (0.178) (0.158) (0.168)
     Math, Multi-year, Peer Comparison 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.022
(0.136) (0.147) (0.130) (0.138)
     Math, Single-year, Peer Comparison -0.003 0.013 0.001 0.024
(0.154) (0.159) (0.147) (0.150)
     ELA, Multi-year, City Comparison -0.014 -0.002 -0.018 0.011
(0.135) (0.125) (0.132) (0.121)
     ELA, Multi-year, Peer Comparison -0.011 0.002 -0.016 0.010
(0.092) (0.091) (0.086) (0.089)
     ELA, Single-year, Peer Comparison -0.013 0.003 -0.019 0.012
(0.105) (0.109) (0.101) (0.109)
Teacher Experience in School Year 2006-2007
     None (First Year of Teaching was 2006-2007) 9.0% 10.8% 9.6% 10.4%
     One Year 11.7% 10.8% 10.6% 8.6%
     Two Years 10.9% 10.6% 11.0% 8.6%
     Three Years 8.6% 10.9% 8.3% 12.4%
     Four Years 7.4% 6.8% 6.9% 6.4%
     Five to Nine Years 27.9% 26.8% 28.2% 28.1%
     Ten or More Years 24.6% 23.2% 25.3% 25.4%
Turnover
     Employed in DOE, 2007-2008 91.0% 88.1% n/a n/a
     Employed in Same School, 2007-2008 87.2% 83.4% n/a n/a
     Employed in DOE, 2008-2009 84.0% 79.8% 93.1% 92.2%
     Employed in Same School, 2008-2009 77.2% 72.7% 89.5% 89.2%
     Teaching Math/English, 2008-2009 60.4% 56.2% 73.9% 72.3%
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Teachers for whom the principal reported more than 10 
total observations made in the last year are given a value of 11.
Followup SurveyBaseline Survey
Table 4: Principals' Pre-experimental Performance Evaluations and Value-Added
Panel A: "Overall" Performance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Value-added, Multi-year, Peer 0.228** 0.208** 0.160** 0.266** 0.248**
(0.024) (0.052) (0.037) (0.057) (0.024)
Value-added, Single-year, Peer 0.209** 0.023
(0.023) (0.051)
Value-added, Multi-year, Citywide 0.211** 0.093* -0.045
(0.023) (0.036) (0.068)
Teacher Experience Controls √ √
School Fixed Effects √
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.32
Sample Size 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507
Panel B: "Raising Student Achievement" (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Value-added, Multi-year, Peer 0.255** 0.207** 0.172** 0.301** 0.272**
(0.026) (0.054) (0.041) (0.063) (0.025)
Value-added, Single-year, Peer 0.240** 0.056
(0.025) (0.053)
Value-added, Multi-year, Citywide 0.241** 0.114** -0.053
(0.026) (0.041) (0.074)
Teacher Experience Controls √ √
School Fixed Effects √
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.38
Sample Size 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is the principal's overall evaluation of the teacher; in Panel B it is the 
principals evaluation of the teacher's ability to raise student achievement.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered by school. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1. 
Table 5: Pre-experimental Performance Evaluations and Value-Added, by Subject Area 
Panel A: "Overall" Performance Only Math Only English
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Value-added in Math 0.385** 0.191** 0.103**
(0.059) (0.031) (0.031)
Value-added in English 0.159* 0.216** 0.174**
(0.075) (0.030) (0.030)
R-squared 0.51 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.34
Sample Size 544 456 1,507 1,507 1,507
Panel B: "Raising Student Achievement" Only Math Only English
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Value-added in Math 0.378** 0.226** 0.138**
(0.065) (0.032) (0.032)
Value-added in English 0.219** 0.251** 0.180**
(0.071) (0.033) (0.034)
R-squared 0.55 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.41
Sample Size 544 457 1,507 1,507 1,507
Math and English 
Note: Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data and comparisons to peer teachers.  All 
specifications include school fixed effects and controls for teaching experience. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered by school. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1.
Math and English 
Table 6: Principals' Pre-experimental Ratings and Subject Specific Value-Added
Math/English
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value-added, Math/English 0.004 0.054**
(0.010) (0.012)
Value-added, Math 0.028* 0.017
(0.011) (0.011)
Value-added, English -0.007 0.049**
(0.010) (0.012)
Principal's Performance Evaluation
    Raising Math and/or English Achievement 0.880**
(0.014)
     Overall 0.878**
(0.015)
    Raising Math Achievement 0.924** 0.932**
(0.015) (0.014)
    Raising English Achievement 0.873** 0.881**
(0.014) (0.014)
Restricted to Teachers of Math and English √ √ √ √
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82
Sample Size 2,507 2,507 1,507 1,507 1,507 1,507




Evaluation for Raising Student Achievement
Table 7: Performance Evaluations and the Precision of Value-Added Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value-added 0.228** 0.078** 0.100** 0.100** 0.255** 0.106** 0.127** 0.129**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Estimate Precision 0.146** 0.155** 0.154** 0.145** 0.151** 0.150**
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Value-added * Estimate Precision 0.108** 0.123** 0.111** 0.101** 0.118** 0.124**
     (0.028) (0.030) (0.038) (0.035) (0.031) (0.038)
Teacher Experience and School FE √ √ √ √
Years of Value-added Data FE √ √
R-squared 0.05 0.09 0.35 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.40 0.40
Sample Size 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507
Note: Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data and comparisons with peers. Precision is measured as the 
inverse of the standard-error of the value-added estimate, normalized to have a minimum value of zero and a standard deviation of 
one.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1. 
Student Achievement EvaluationOverall Evaluation
Table 8: Value-Added and the Precision of Performance Evaluations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Principal's Overall Evaluation 0.151** 0.103* 0.056
(0.032) (0.046) (0.084)
Principal's Overall Evaluation 0.011+ 0.016+ 0.034*
     * Years of Experience as Principal (0.007) (0.008) (0.016)
Principal's Evaluation of Raising Achievement 0.158** 0.120** 0.054
(0.032) (0.046) (0.082)
Principal's Evaluation of Raising Achievement 0.015* 0.018* 0.039**
     * Years of Experience as Principal (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
Limited to Teachers with <10 Years Experience √ √
Limited to Teachers with <5 Years Experience √ √
R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09
Sample Size 1,215 815 363 1,215 815 363
Note: The dependent variable is the teacher's value-added estimate (combining math and English) based on three 
years of data and comparisons to peers, and only teachers with three years of data used in their value-added 
estimate are included in the sample.  All specifications include a control for years of experience as principal, 
though in no regression is this coefficient statistically significant. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
by school. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1. 
Table 9: Classroom Observations by Principals and Value-added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value-added -0.081+ -0.094* -0.052** -0.026+ -0.075 -0.092 -0.089** -0.035
(0.041) (0.039) (0.015) (0.015) (0.099) (0.099) (0.028) (0.028)
Overall Performance Evaluation -0.105** -0.217**
(0.023) (0.043)
Teacher Experience Fixed Effects √ √ √ √ √ √
School Fixed Effects √ √ √ √
R-squared 0.00 0.13 0.76 0.77 0.00 0.02 0.89 0.89
Sample Size 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487
Formal Observations Total Observations
Note: Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data and comparisons with peers. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered by school. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1. 
Table 10: The Impact of Value-added Information on Performance Evaluations
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added 0.123** 0.017 0.106 0.149** 0.038 0.111 0.087* 0.037 0.05 0.135** 0.054 0.081
(0.030) (0.026) [p=0.008] (0.033) (0.025) [p=0.007] (0.040) (0.033) [p=0.335] (0.047) (0.036) [p=0.171]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment 0.793** 0.824** -0.031 0.724** 0.760** -0.036 0.758** 0.765** -0.007 0.663** 0.714** -0.051
(0.033) (0.035) [p=0.519] (0.042) (0.040) [p=0.535] (0.071) (0.067) [p=0.943] (0.077) (0.079) [p=0.644]
Estimate Precision
     * Value-added 0.072* -0.013 0.085 0.057 -0.011 0.068
(0.031) (0.039) [p=0.088] (0.038) (0.034) [p=0.183]
     * Overall Evaluation -0.046 0.007 -0.053 -0.044 0.005 -0.049
     (0.029) (0.035) [p=0.244] (0.030) (0.039) [p=0.319]
Years Principal Observes Teacher
     * Value-added -0.081* -0.016 -0.065 -0.082* -0.02 -0.062
(0.038) (0.040) [p=0.239] (0.040) (0.046) [p=0.309]
     * Overall Evaluation 0.115** 0.041 0.074 0.135** 0.031 0.104
(0.034) (0.038) [p=0.147] (0.038) (0.045) [p=0.078]
Experience Controls √ √ √ √
School Fixed Effects √ √ √ √
R-squared 0.56 0.57 0.69 0.68 0.57 0.58 0.70 0.68
Sample Size 744 780 744 780 744 780 744 780
(1)
Note: The dependent variable is the principal's overall evaluation of the teacher in the follow-up survey.  Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data 
and comparisons with peers. Precision is measured as the inverse of the confidence interval of the value-added estimate, normalized to have a minimum value of zero and a 
standard deviation of one.  Years principal has supervised the teacher is equal to the minimum of the years of data used to construct the valued added estimate and the 
principals years of experience in the school. All specifications control for teacher experience fixed effects.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school; p-
values on the test of differences in brackets. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1.
(2) (4)(3)
Table 11: Impact of Value-added on Performance Evaluation, by Subject
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added, Math 0.147** 0.003 0.144
     (0.032) (0.028) [p=0.001]
Value-added, English 0.031 0.029 0.002
     (0.034) (0.027) [p=0.963]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment 0.772** 0.819** -0.047 0.818** 0.813** 0.005
0.037 0.035 [p=0.356] 0.04 0.041 [p=0.93]
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.55
Sample Size 616 631 580 607
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added, Math 0.192** 0.036 0.156
     (0.054) (0.051) [p=0.036]
Value-added, English -0.088 -0.003 -0.085
     (0.075) (0.08) [p=0.439]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment 0.765** 0.845** -0.08 0.915** 0.842** 0.073
(0.068) (0.053) [p=0.354] (0.045) (0.086) [p=0.453]
R-squared 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.57
Sample Size 156 161 108 129
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added, Math 0.121** -0.028 0.149
     (0.035) (0.027) [p=0.001]
Value-added, English 0.025 0.034 -0.009
     (0.036) (0.031) [p=0.85]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment 0.773** 0.804** -0.031 0.798** 0.795** 0.003
(0.043) (0.046) [p=0.623] (0.047) (0.046) [p=0.964]
R-squared 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.53
Sample Size 452 458 452 458
(3) (4)
Note: The dependent variable is the principal's evaluation of a teacher's overall effectiveness in the follow-
up survey.  Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data and comparisons to peer 
teachers.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1. 
Math English
(1) (2)
Both Math & English 
(5) (6)
Math Only English Only
Table 12: Impact of Value-Added Information on Classroom Observation
Levels Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment School 0.064 0.165 -0.175 -0.210
(0.161) (0.126) (0.513) (0.525)
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Sample Size 1,523 1,523 1,520 1,520
Changes
Total Observations
Note: Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data and 
comparisons to peer teachers.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by school. 
**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1. 
Changes
Formal Observations
Table 13: Impact of Value-added Information on a Teachers' Propensity to Exit the School
Panel A: OLS
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added -0.026* -0.001 -0.025 -0.021+ 0.009 -0.03 -0.020 0.010 -0.03
(0.012) (0.010) [p=0.11] (0.012) (0.011) [p=0.065] (0.012) (0.012) [p=0.077]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment -0.018 -0.051** 0.033 -0.015 -0.034* 0.019
(0.013) (0.015) [p=0.097] (0.015) (0.016) [p=0.386]
Teacher Experience and School FE √ √
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.19
Sample Size 1,103 1,032 1,103 1,032 1,103 1,032
Panel B: Logit
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added -0.233* -0.007 -0.226 -0.189+ 0.095 -0.284 -0.159 0.134 -0.293
(0.105) (0.102) [p=0.123] (0.111) (0.102) [p=0.06] (0.099) (0.133) [p=0.077]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment -0.160 -0.488** 0.328 -0.176 -0.379* 0.203
(0.116) (0.128) [p=0.058] (0.142) (0.153) [p=0.331]
Teacher Experience and School FE √ √
Sample Size 1,103 1,032 1,103 1,032 707 643
Note: Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three years of data and comparisons to peer teachers.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered by school; p-values on the test of differences in brackets. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1.  
(2) (3)(1)
(4) (5) (6)
Table 14: Impact of Value-added on Propensity to Exit the School, by Subject
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added (in Math) -0.355** -0.03 -0.325 -0.304* 0.071 -0.375
(0.116) (0.126) [p=0.058] (0.125) (0.127) [p=0.035]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment -0.192 -0.441** 0.249
(0.128) (0.142) [p=0.193]
Sample Size 936 844 936 844
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Value-added (in Math) 0.064 0.229 -0.165 0.059 0.251+ -0.192
(0.288) (0.142) [p=0.608] (0.291) (0.143) [p=0.554]
Overall Evaluation, Pre-experiment 0.053 -0.593** 0.646
(0.222) (0.23) [p=0.044]
Sample Size 167 188 167 188
Note: All specifications are logit regressions. Value-added refers to estimates based on up to three 
years of data and comparisons to peer teachers.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
school; p-values on the test of differences in brackets. **p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1.  
Teachers of Only Math or Math and English





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment School  0.024  0.024  0.022 0.040  0.057*  0.044+
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
[0.16] [0.17] [0.25] [0.10] [0.04] [0.09]
Overall Evaluation (Pre-experiment)  0.074**  0.052**
(0.011) (0.011)
Value-added (Pre-experiment)  0.076**
(0.010)
Teacher Experience Controls √ √ √ √ √
Student-level Covariates √ √ √ √
Restricted to Teachers in Pilot Sample √ √ √
Sample Size 69,889 69,889 69,889 25,367 25,367 25,367
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment School -0.010 -0.012  0.011 -0.006 0.021 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
[0.45] [0.37] [0.47] [0.76] [0.35] [0.80]
Overall Evaluation (Pre-experiment)  0.078**  0.067**
(0.012) (0.012)
Value-added (Pre-experiment)  0.048**
(0.011)
Teacher Experience Controls √ √ √ √ √
Student-level Covariates √ √ √ √
Restricted to Teachers in Pilot Sample √ √ √
Sample Size 67,835 67,835 67,835 23,603 23,603 23,603
Note: The dependent variables are gains in individual student test scores from 2008 to 2009, and regressions are 
estimated with school and teacher level random effects. P-values on tests of differences between treatment and 
control in brackets. *p<0.05, +p<0.1.
Math










Years of Experience as Evaluator 8.620 8.666 0.046 0.94
Only the Principal Contributed to the Survey 0.532 0.509 -0.023 0.73
Asst. Principal also Contributed to Survey 0.404 0.474 0.070 0.30
Lead Teacher also Contributed to Survey 0.083 0.117 0.034 0.41
Other Person also Contributed to Survey 0.128 0.16 0.032 0.50
Already Monitor Test Score Growth 0.807 0.803 -0.004 0.94
Top 2 Ways to Assess (Other than Observation) Include
      Student Work 0.892 0.857 -0.035 0.44
      State Level Standardized Tests 0.775 0.75 -0.025 0.67
      Feedback from Other Administrators 0.153 0.196 0.043 0.40
      Feedback from Students 0.081 0.062 -0.019 0.59
      Teacher Work Portfolio 0.045 0.045 -0.000 0.99
      Feedback from Parents 0.018 0.036 0.018 0.42
      Feedback from Other Teachers 0.009 0.036 0.027 0.18
      Other School Related Tasks 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.57
Value Added Reports would be Extremely Useful for…
     Professional Development 0.818 0.83 0.012 0.81
     Assessment of Staffing Needs 0.664 0.697 0.033 0.60
     Assessment of Teachers 0.636 0.732 0.096 0.13
     Assignment of Students to Teachers 0.564 0.679 0.115  0.08+
     Tenure Decisions 0.545 0.607 0.062 0.35
     Curricular Choices 0.436 0.526 0.090 0.18
Concerns Regarding Test Scores
(1-5, 1 = Extremely Valid, 5 = Extremely Invalid)
     Tests Cannot Measure Other Important Outcomes 1.718 1.657 -0.061 0.63
     Tests do not Measure Learning Well 3.064 3.179 0.115 0.39
     Tests are Biased 3.155 3.161 0.006 0.97
     Teachers are Not Primarily Responsible for Test Outcomes 3.591 3.839 0.248 0.12
     Tests do not Measure Our Curriculum 3.591 3.697 0.106 0.48
Level of Agreement with Following Statements
(1-5, 1 = Strongly Agree, 5 = Strongly Disagree)
     I  am satisfied with teaching applicants at my school 2.550 2.58 0.030 0.81
     I  can select the best teachers from my applicants 2.211 2.125 -0.086 0.40
     I  know who the most effective teachers are in my school 1.284 1.259 -0.025 0.69
     I  can retain the most effective teachers in my school 1.769 1.786 0.017 0.88
     I  can dismiss the least effective teachers in my school 2.789 2.893 0.104 0.54
    Anyone can be an effective teacher 3.266 3.393 0.127 0.41
     I  can improve my teachers' performance (composite) 1.884 2.000 0.116 0.17
    Teachers in my school are cooperative/satisfied (composite) 1.927 1.944 0.017 0.81
Table A1: Baseline Survey Responses for Treatment-Control Principals
Note: There are 112 treatment schools and 111 control schools.  P-values indicate the statistical significance of a 









Only the Principal Contributed to the Survey 0.462 0.55 0.090 0.25
Asst. Principal also Contributed to Survey 0.462 0.39 -0.077 0.32
Lead Teacher also Contributed to Survey 0.121 0.12 -0.005 0.91
Other Person also Contributed to Survey 0.275 0.14 -0.134  0.03*
Top 4 Ways to Assess (Other than Observation) Include
      State Level Standardized Tests 0.957 0.93 -0.031 0.38
      Student Work 0.817 0.84 0.022 0.70
      Periodic Assessments 0.559 0.58 0.021 0.78
      End of Course Exams 0.215 0.17 -0.042 0.49
      Other Student Tests 0.075 0.11 0.036 0.42
      Feedback from Other Administrators 0.591 0.59 0.001 0.99
      Feedback from Students 0.290 0.26 -0.031 0.65
      Feedback from Parents 0.183 0.15 -0.035 0.54
      Feedback from Other Teachers 0.108 0.19 0.078 0.15
      Teacher Work Portfolio 0.129 0.10 -0.030 0.54
      Other School Related Tasks 0.075 0.09 0.011 0.79
To Evaluate Individual Teachers in Past Year, Principal Used
     Average State Test Scores 0.859 0.94 0.079  0.09+
     Average State Test Scores by Subgroup 0.761 0.81 0.049 0.44
     Average Growth in State Test Scores 0.815 0.91 0.097  0.07+
     Value-Added Reports (Treatment Only) 0.550 0.55 0 0.07
     Percentage of Students Not Meeting Standards on State Tests 0.856 0.86 0.007 0.90
     Percentage of Students by Proficiency Level 0.913 0.93 0.012 0.78
     Change in Percentage of Students by Proficiency Level 0.846 0.88 0.029 0.59
If Using Student Tests to Assess An Individual Teacher, 
  How Important is it to Consider the Following Isssue
  (1-5, 1=Not Important at All, 5 = Very Important)
     Mean of All 12 Items Below 3.612 3.81 0.196  0.07+
     Teaching Experience 3.615 3.74 0.128 0.46
     Prior Performance of Students on Standardized Tests 4.582 4.37 -0.211  0.08+
     Percentage ELL/Special Education Students in Class 4.099 4.30 0.205 0.23
     Class Size 3.578 3.81 0.232 0.21
     The Number of Students who Entered the class mid-year. 3.533 4.01 0.479  0.01*
     Which Teacher(s) the Students Had in the Previous Year 3.678 4.12 0.438  0.00*
     If a Teacher Recently Started Teaching a New Grade/Subject 3.912 4.13 0.216 0.17
     If a Teacher had a Personal Issue During the Year 3.367 3.66 0.292  0.10+
     Things that Distracted the Teacher's Class on the Test Day 3.067 3.12 0.051 0.81
     Outside Help a Teacher’s Students Received 3.811 4.00 0.189 0.21
     Help a Teacher Received from an Aide in the Classroom. 3.111 3.21 0.097 0.58
     The Teacher's Performance in Teaching Non-tested Subjects 3.297 3.54 0.242 0.16
Table A2: Follow-up Survey Responses for Treatment-Control Principals (Common Questions)
Note: This table is based on the survey responses of 82 treatment school principals and 93 control school principals 
who partially or fully completed the second portion of the follow-up survey.  P-values indicate the statistical 
significance of a treatment indicator in a principal level regression.
Treatment
Mean
Principal Received Professional Development 0.94
Principal Received Value-Added Reports 0.85
Principal Examined Value-Added Reports 0.84
Principal Shared the Reports with
     Assistant Principal 0.95
     Lead Teacher 0.74
     Teachers 0.51
     School Support Organization 0.27
     Superintendent 0.10
     Network Leader 0.09
     Union Representative 0.03
     Parents 0.02
(1-5 Scale) The Value-added Reports...
     Contain Information Useful to Principals 4.29
     Contain Information Useful to Teachers 4.05
     Are Easy to Understand 3.36
     Have Helped Me Better Understand Differences Between Teachers 3.59
     Have Enhanced my Plans for Improving Instruction in my School 3.73
(1-5 Scale) How Useful Would Annual Value-Added Reports be for …
     Designing Professional Development for Teachers 3.76
     Assigning Students to Teachers 3.89
     Choices of Curricula or Instructional Programs 3.27
     Assessing Staffing Needs 3.59
     Teacher Evaluation 3.86
Principal is Confident that Value-Added Calculations Account for...
(Yes = 1, No = 0)
     Teaching Experience 0.77
     Prior Performance of Students on Standardized Tests 0.76
     Percentage ELL/Special Education Students in a Teacher’s Class 0.48
     Class Size 0.40
     The Number of Students who Entered the Class Mid-Year. 0.27
     Which Teacher(s) the Students Had in the Previous Year 0.45
     If a Teacher Recently Started Teaching a New Grade/Subject 0.53
     If a Teacher had a Personal Issue During the Year 0.08
     Things that Distracted the Teacher's Class on the Test Day 0.18
     Outside Help a Teacher’s Students Received (e.g., after-school) 0.10
     Help a Teacher Received from an Aide in the Classroom. 0.13
     The Teacher's Performance in Teaching Non-tested Subjects 0.07
Table A3: Follow-up Survey Responses for Treatment Principals
Note: 84 treatment schools responded to the follow-up survey, but only 79 completed the 
second section (after evaluating their teachers) and only 66 principals who claimed to have 
received and examined the reports were asked the remainder of these questions.
